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As we write this, philosophers all over the world are in a state of temporary,
collective self-scrutiny. ey are poring over the results of the PhilPapers
Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourget—a grand-scale
survey of the profession’s views on 30 major philosophical issues, ranging
from aesthetic value to zombies. More than 3000 people have responded,
and many more are currently absorbing and analyzing the results.1
Or are they? Well, so it seems, from discussions at our departments and
in various socialmedia on the internet. However, what engages philosophers
right now is an empirical issue, not reliably settled by such anecdotal and
parochial evidence. But we are philosophers and, as such, not above making
rash guesses from our desk chairs; old habits die hard.
What is immediately evident from Chalmers’ and Bourget’s survey re-
sults is that philosophers are not timid when it comes to holding forth on
dicult questions. We are somewhat more cautious when asked to take a
stand on empirical questions, like those of the meta-survey where Chalmers
and Bourget asked subjects to estimate the results of the original survey: the
meta-survey received roughly a h as many responses as the original one.
And those of us who did proer guesses in the meta-survey did a fairly bad
job at guessing the relative popularity of competing views. is is not sur-
prising, given that what most of us did in the meta-survey was to take a stab
in the dark about empirical issues we had no solid evidence for.
e meta-survey provides a solid way of calibrating error and success.
But what about the original survey, about the big philosophical questions?
Obviously, there is no facile way of calibrating the reliability of the answers
here. But philosophicalmethodology has recently become a vigorous branch
of philosophy itself. In particular, much discussion has concerned the use of
intuitions in philosophy: whether they are any better when it comes to ad-
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ii The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy
jucating philosophical truth than, say, the sociological truths uncovered by
the meta-survey.is issue is dedicated to a continuation of that discussion.
1. What are intuitions?
e question of the nature of intuitions and the question of their evidential
value (or other roles) in philosophy are hard to extricate from one another.
It is natural to suggest that the evidential value of intuitions will depend on
what they are. But the question of what they are (or what should count as
an intuition) is not altogether independent of the question of what role they
play. One reason for this is that ‘intuition’ is sometimes used as a functional
term for whatever fullls certains roles, among them a certain evidential
role, as Herbert Feigl (1958), quoted by Sebastian Lutz in his paper in this
volume, notes. But it is just one sense; as Feigl also notes, there are other
senses which are neutral on the question of evidential value. In one sense,
intuitions are psychological phenomena, whose existence has to be granted
but does not in itself imply any epistemic role. is much may be agreed
upon even by defenders of intuitions as evidence. But such a psychologistic
view invites the question: what sort of psychological phenomena?
In both ordinary and in some philosophers’ usage, ‘intuition’ has some-
times been taken to refer to a special faculty of the mind, whose products
are called ‘intuitions’.e claim that there is such a distinctive faculty of the
mind has become less widespread in contemporary philosophy than it once
was. But the “faculty view” is by nomeans extinct. Chomsky’s claim that lin-
guistic intuitions are products of our linguistic competence is more than a
little reminiscent of the traditional faculty view (cf. (Hintikka 1999), which
argues that the surge in philosophical appeals to intutions was largely in-
spired by the Chomskyan conception of linguistic intuitions). And contem-
porary rationalists have argued that intuitions are produced by something
akin to a faculty of intuition.
In modern philosophy, however, the word is ususally taken to denote
tokens or types of psychological phenomena, rather than a faculty. e av-
erage philosopher typically has many such intuitions during her work-life,
encounters appeals to them, and invokes them herself to defend or criti-
cize various theses. However, it may be that the things called ‘intuitions’
even in (broadly spekaing) contemporary analytic philosophy do not form
a homogenous class of things, united in the way the members of a natural
kind are supposed to be united. Sebastian Lutz in eect makes this claim
in pressing the distinction between intuitions in the sense of hunches about
empirical matters, on the one hand, and posited analogues to sense percep-
tions about trans-empirical (mathematical, modal, perhaps moral) matters,
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on the other.2 Clearly, the word ‘intuition’ is used in contexts which are em-
pirical (including psychological) as well as in contexts which are concerned
with non-empirical questions. Opinions on how much disunity this intro-
duces will vary with one’s view of the importance of the distinction, and
perhaps with what one envisages the purview of philosophy to be.
1.1 Intuitions as propositional attitudes
Intuitions are frequently deemed true or false.is invites the view that they
are like beliefs at least in being truth-valued propositional attitudes, which
are true or false according to whether their contents are true or false. e
view that intuitions have propositional content is shared by several contrib-
utors to this volume. Brian Talbot argues that in addition to having con-
tent, they are also experiences. With George Bealer (e.g. Bealer 1998), he
claims that they are a distinctive kind of seemings, distinguished from e.g.
memory-, inference- and perception-based seemings by having a partly un-
known etiology. According to this view, which Talbot takes to be widely
shared in philosophy, “intuitions are things that strike us as true without us
knowing entirely why they do”.
Mark Fedyk also undertakes to give a descriptive account of the term’s
use in contemporary philosophy, and also takes the consensus to be that
intuitions are content-bearers. Jonathan Ichikawa suggests that intuitions
simply are beliefs, as David Lewis has claimed.3
e identication of intuitions with (a certain class of) beliefs has been
critized, notably by Bealer (e.g., Bealer 1996). He argues that belief, unlike
intuitions are plastic; that intuitions have a phenomenology distinct from
belief in beling seemings; that unlike beliefs, intuitions are restricted to cer-
tain types of modal contents; and that the intuition that pmay coexist with
the belief that not-p in a way suggesting that it is something dierent from
the belief that p (a point that seems related to the putative lack of plasticity
of intuitions). But the arguments from lack of plasticity and restricted con-
tents may only go to show that not all beliefs are intuitions (cf. Sosa 1996),
and the phenomenology of intuition (and of belief) remains controversial.
e argument from robustness of intuitions in the face of beliefs with in-
compatible contents may be stronger. It may, however, be explained by the
claim that intuitions are inclinations to believe: the view espoused by Joshua
2 John Symons (2008) similarly argues that Russell’s and Moore’s usage of ‘intuition’ to de-
note approximately common sense opinion was exapted, and subtly changed, by Kripke to
refer to something capable of grounding claims about metaphysical modality.
3 Cf. (Lewis 1983, x). A variant on the belief thesis is to say that intuitions are judgments
(cf. also (Williamson 2007, ch. 7), who takes them to be “judgments, or inclinations to
judgments”).
iv The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy
Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux.
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux claim that intuitions are neither evidence
nor beliefs. Being inclinations, they are “innermental states or events”, which
do, however, have a content—the same contents as the beliefs they tend
to cause. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux are thus in agreement with the view
that intuitions are bearers of propositional content, although the function
of appeals to intuition is rhetorical rather than evidential, on their view. A
more radical departure from the content viewwould be a position analogous
to Davidson’s view of observations as a class of psychological phenomena
causally related to (observation) beliefs, but not themselves endowed with
propositional content. On such a view, intuitionswould be causal precursors
to beliefs, but not themselves content-bearers.
Another issue is whether intuitions are episodic, occurent mental phe-
nomena, or whether they may be dispositional states like beliefs or inclina-
tions. It is sometimes argued that since intuitions are episodic, they cannot
be identied with inclinations to believe. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux dis-
cuss and reject this argument.
1.2 Etiology and phenomenology
On Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s view, intuitions are things that play a cer-
tain causal role: they cause belifes. A more common stance is to take intu-
itions to be demarcated by having a special etiology.e faculty view is one
variant of this stance. But philosophers to whom the faculty view is foreign
also frequently characterize intuitions in terms of etiology. e very dis-
tinction between observation or perception, on the one hand, and intuition,
on the other, is oen made to turn on taking intuitions to be independent
of sensory perception, at least among their proximal causes. At the same
time, intuition is oen characterized in terms of a supposedly special phe-
nomenology: intuitions are taken to be marked by directness, (apparent)
non-inferentiality, (subjective) compellingness or “glow”, et cetera. ese
phenomenological attributes are those oen used to characterize percep-
tion. Combining the phenomenological and the etiological conditions on
intuitions, then, invites the widely shared view (denied by Earlenbaugh and
Molyneux as well as by Ichikawa) that intuitions are a sort of non-empirical
evidence, available to philosophers for evaluating non-empirical theories.
But are intuitions evidence?
e question ofwhether intuitions aremarked by a specic phenomenol-
ogy is relevant to their epistemic status. For on some theories, such as Bealer’s,
intuitions are a chief route to non-empirical knowledge. But to provide
grounds for believing a proposition to an armchair thinker, the thinkermust
also have some means for identifying what an intuition is. If intuitions are
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marked by a special phenomenology (and perhaps a specic form or type of
content; cf below), they may be identiable a priori as well.
e demand for a specic etiology, on the other hand, pulls in the op-
posite direction.is is perhaps more obvious if we consider the idea that a
“good”, epistemically valuable intuition, must have a specic type of causal
ancestry. We don’t know just how intuitions arise; and their etiology is not
introspectively knowable, beyond the minimal negative characterization of
them as non-observational, non-memorial, not based on conscious infer-
ence, etc. Hence, the combination of phenomenological and etiological de-
mands on what counts as an intuition may still render something’s status
as an intuition (or as a good one) an a posteriori matter. is question is
discussed in the essay by Talbot, as well as by Weinberg and Crowley.
1.3 Content and form
Sometimes, the term ‘intuition’ is restricted to mental phenomena whose
contents are particular propositions. is seems to be an assumption, for
instance, in certain accounts of reective equilibrium, when mutual adjust-
ment is said to take place between general principles and intuitions about
individual cases. Sometimes, however, the term is used in a way allowing
very general and abstract contents, such as propositions inmathematics and
set theory. Mark Fedyk suggests that, contrary to what is sometimes held,
the content of an intuition is not a proposition about a concept, but about
the salient properties of a case. For instance, the intuitions evoked by Get-
tier cases are not about the concept of knowledge, but about properties of the
doxastic states of the protagonists inGettier cases.is suggests a restriction
to particular cases, since cases evoking intuitions are particular.
Further demands are sometimes put on the contents of what may count
as an intuition.us Bealer holds that intuitions concern only priori propo-
sitions (cf. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux). And several philosophers have
claimed that a rational intuition always has a modal content (Bealer 1998,
Sosa 1998, BonJour 1997, Grundmann 2007).
1.4 Intension, extension, and nature
eremay bemore widespread agreement onwhat the extension of the term
‘intuition’ is than on what its meaning is, or should be. is enables some
room for fruitful discussion of their evidential (or other) role. But a dierent
question seems to be more pressing.is is whether the phenomena in the
extension are things that share a common nature or form a unied kind at
all. At present, this question still seems quite far from resolution. And even
if we grant that intuitions may be categorized into various types according
to subject matter etc, and even if we disregard penumbral or disputed cases,
vi The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy
the question still remains: do these things share a common nature?
is is a question relevant both for arguments attacking and defending
the status of intuitions as evidence. For if an experimental philosopher, say,
argues that some class of intuitions, e.g. in epistemology, are unreliable indi-
cators of truth, the argument depends on an ampliative inference from the
particular cases (and, of course, the particular subjects; cf. Weinberg and
Crowley) demonstrably subject to error. And this ampliative inference will
be variously legitimate, depending on how homogenous the class of intu-
itions indicted by the argument is.
Similarly, a defense of the evidential value by pointing to the success of
certain intuitions turns on the legitimacy of inferring that what holds for the
successful intuitions may be projected to the intuitions one wants to defend.
is is also an ampliative inference that will be stronger or weaker according
to how similar the intuitions one is defending are to the ones adduced as
defense.
Naturally, the question of the shared nature (or lack of one) is not in-
dependent of what the items that we want to pick out by the term are. It is
not impossible that in the future, as a long-term but somewhat frustrating
legacy of current debates in philosophy and psychology, wewill operate with
several dierent concepts of intuition in parallel: one dened according to
phenomenology, one according to psychological etiology, etc. Something
like this has arguably happened before in other contexts, for instance with
the concept of a gene (cf. Griths andNeumann-Held 1999). Such pluralism
might result in dierent verdicts on whether intuitions have a common na-
ture, depending on which concept or dimension is salient. Earlenbaugh and
Molyneux suggest that philosophical intuitions are psychologically homoge-
nous but epistemically heterogeneous. is is a claim exemplifying a sort of
qualication that may perhaps become quite common.
2. Intuitions and X-Phi: Should philosophers trust their intu-
itions?
Aman goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken.
But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it.
en he cooks it and eats it. Do you think this person is doing some-
thingmorally wrong?
As the psychologist Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues found in an empir-
ical study (Haidt et al. 1993), our intuitions about the moral acceptability
of such a case vary with our socio-economic background: e lower your
socio-economic standing the more likely you are to nd this case morally
problematic.
e point is not that subjects with a lower socio-economic standing are
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mistaken in their moralization of such behavior while subjects with higher
standing would have the more correct gut reactions.e diculty is rather
to decide which of such conicting responses can properly serve as a con-
straint on ethical theory, when actually bothmay be results of apparently ar-
bitrary, and philosophically irrelevant cultural factors. In the last few years
“experimental philosophers”, following the methodology of Haidt and his
colleagues, found many of our philosophical intuitions to be subject to vari-
ation in response to philosophically irrelevant factors—not only in ethics,
but also in such areas as philosophy of language and epistemology.
2.1 e Challenge of Experimental Philosophy
e fact that ordinary people have intuitions that dier from the views of
professionally trained philosophers is perhaps prima facie not very surpris-
ing: of course, the woman in the street also has dierent intuitions about
physics than a professional physicist has.
What makes the results of experimental philosophy so challenging to
traditional philosophy is the fact that philosophical methodology seems to
give intuitions such a big role—a role that is unlike the role intuitions would
have in other sciences. Of course, physicists make experiments and thereby
test their theories. Philosophers do not test their theories empirically in the
lab, they seem to test their theories in the armchair, usually by reecting on
what we would or should say about a certain imaginary case. In other words:
philosophers test their theories by conducting thought experiments.
As an example, take the discussion in epistemology about the right anal-
ysis of ‘knowledge’. For a long time, philosophers were convinced that the
correct analysis of ‘knowledge’ is in terms of justied, true belief. According
to this account, a person P knows that q if and only if P has the justied,
true belief that q.
Now imagine that some guy named Bob has a friend Jill who has driven
a Buick formany years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives anAmerican car.
Bob is not aware, however, that Jill’s Buick has recently been stolen, and he
is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a dierent
kind of American car. Now, Bob’s belief that Jill drives an American car is
justied, since it is based on Bob’s observation. It is also still true, because Jill
does drive an American car. But is Bob’s belief knowledge? Does Bob know
that Jill is driving an American car?
Most philosophers were convinced by cases like these (when presented
by Edmund Gettier in 1963) that Bob does not know that Jill is driving an
American car and that there is something wrong with the standard account
of knowledge, and that knowledge isn’t just justied true belief. And these
philosophers were convinced by this case, because they found it intuitively
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false to say about it that Bob knows that Jill drives an American car. e
result was that themajority of philosophers concluded that the justied, true
belief account of knowledge is mistaken.
However, in empirical studies that were conducted by Jonathan Wein-
berg, ShaunNichols and Stephen Stich (2001), it turned out that people from
East-Asia and from India show signicantly dierent reactions when pre-
sented with this case, than Americans of European descent do. While peo-
ple from the West largely agree with philosophers that Bob does not have
knowledge, the majority of people from East-Asia or India believe that Bob
does know.
Does that mean that they have a dierent concept of knowledge than
people in theWest? But if philosophers are only reconstructing theWestern
concept of knowledge, with what justication are they ignoring the Eastern
concept? Do we know that ours is better or more accurate? If so, how do we
know that? In response to a similar result regarding the cultural variation
of intuitions, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen
Stich formulate the challenge thus:
We nd it wildly implausible that the [. . . ] intuitions of the narrow
cross-section of humanity who are Western academic philosophers
are a more reliable indicator of the correct theory [. . . ] than the dif-
fering [. . . ] intuitions of other cultural or linguistic groups. Indeed,
given the intense training and selection that undergraduate and grad-
uate students in philosophy have to go through, there is good reason
to suspect that the alleged reective intuitions may be reinforced in-
tuitions. In the absence of a principled argument about why philoso-
phers’ intuitions are superior, this project smacks of narcissism in the
extreme. (Machery et al. 2004, 9)
In any case, philosophers seem to assume that their philosophical intu-
itions are universally shared. Experimental philosophy, on the other hand,
seems to show that this assumption is mistaken. Does that mean that philo-
sophical methodology needs to change? Does it show that we can’t and
shouldn’t trust intuitions anymore when deciding about philosophical the-
ories? Or does it show that we need to do serious cross-cultural empirical
research about the intuitions of the man in the street from Tallinn to Taipeh,
instead of trying to evaluate philosophical matters from the armchair?
3. Evidence for What?
Whether intuitions are evidence depends, of course, on what they are sup-
posed to be evidence for. In contemporary (analytic) philosophy we can
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distinguish the ideal types4 of at least three dierent conceptions of what
philosophical analysis is concerned with that correspond to three dierent
evaluations of whether intuitions should be considered evidence in philos-
ophy.
A traditional conceptionwhich, arguably, also represents themainstream
(cf.Williamson 2007), considers philosophical questions like ‘What is truth?’,
‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is consciousness?’ to be concerned with extra-
linguistic subject matter. On that conception, the answers to these problems
are not analytic truths, nor do these questions concern the choice of linguis-
tic conventions. ere are several ways in which one might come to hold
this position. On the traditional understanding, philosophy is concerned
with “metaphysical” truths or is attempting to investigate the “essences” of
things; metaphysical truth is then construed as made true by non-linguistic
facts about Reality, and essences are properties that things may or may not
have, independently of our practices in using language. On a variant of the
same conception, philosophy is considered continuous with the other sci-
ences. us philosophy is interested in broadly the same kind of truths the
other sciences are interested in, and answers its questions in cooperation
with them.
On a second conception, philosophy is considered a linguistic enter-
prise: instead of inquiring what knowledge, truth and consciousness are,
philosophers investigate what ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘consciousness’mean.
emeaning of these terms being our concepts, this enterprise is oen called
‘conceptual analysis’. One of the motivations for this approach is the belief
that philosophical problems can be (dis-)solved by paying close attention to
the way ordinary language is used.
On a third conception, philosophy is also conceived as a linguistic en-
terprise, but one that is only to a small extent interested in our “ordinary”
concepts of truth, knowledge or consciousness. On this conception, some-
times labelled ‘ideal language conception’, our ordinary concepts are likely
to be imprecise or outright confused, and it is these confusions that lead
to philosophical problems. e aim of philosophy is to replace these with
precisied concepts, which either leads to a dissolution of the philosophical
problem or a restatement of the problems in terms that make them tractable
by the empirical sciences.
If one intends to give special evidential weight to intuitions on the rst
conception, onewill need to present a story that explainswhywe should have
intuitions that reliably inform us about metaphysical or even empirical mat-
4 at we distinguish between three ideal types rather than four or ten is only because these
three seem to map best onto the discussion in this issue. Of course, in philosophy there
are all kinds of intermediate positions.
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ters.is story typically involves some form of rationalism, it identies the
relevant and reliable “rational” intuitions—for example by their phenome-
nal properties—and explains why we should be entitled to them as part of
our rational nature.
Empiricists, on the other hand, typically don’t believe that we have ways
to intuitively know any non-trivial metaphysical facts. Insofar as there are
metaphysical truths, they are knowable in principle in the same way as any
other empirical truth, by empirical means. Accordingly, for an empiricist,
intuitions aren’t very likely to be evidence for extra-linguistic subject matter.
At best, they might be educated hunches (cf. Lutz) which might provide us
with plausible initial hypotheses about a certain subject matter. However,
as soon as they are exhausted as a source for intial hypotheses, controlled
empirical observation should replace intuitions in the process of inquiry:
[W]hat we ought to be doing is not just consulting the beliefs we al-
ready have, but more directly examining the external phenomena;
only then would appeals to intuition be given what, on my view, is
their proper weight.us, appeals to intuition early on in philosoph-
ical investigation should giveway tomore straightforwardly empirical
investigation of external phenomena. (Kornblith 2002, 15)
e second conception, on the other hand, seems to be able to accom-
modate the centralmethodological role of intuitions in philosophy in amuch
easier way, that also seems prima facie acceptable to an empiricist. Perhaps
we don’t have reliable intuitions about extra-mental subject matter, but it
doesn’t seem absurd to think that we could have reliable intuitions about
mental subject matter, e.g. about what we mean by the words we use. us
on the second approach it seems that—given the alternative subject matter
that philosophy investigates—we are put in amuch better epistemic position
with respect to that subject matter, such that it might be a lot easier to argue
for the evidential weight of our intuitions in philosophical investigations.
Moreover, one might think that what, e.g. ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, and ‘con-
sciousness’ mean depends at least in part on the dispositions of competent
speakers to apply these terms to actual and counterfactual cases. And it
is these dispositions that are also known as “intuitions” in philosophical
methodology. On this latter conception, intuitions are not merely evidence,
but in fact constitutive of the relevant truths philosophy is investigating. In
their contribution, Jonathan Weinberg and Stephen Crowley label such a
view constitutivism:
On this account what one of our termsmeans is not, in general, some-
thing that can come totally unstuck from our use of that term, and
as such, how we would apply or withhold the term across a range of
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hypothetical cases may be better viewed not as claims about how the
termmight apply in those situations, but as constraints on any account
of that term’s meaning.
On this conception intuitions seem to be infallible, or, in the words of
Weinberg and Crowley, “it is hard to miss, when you rst wait to see where
the dart goes and then draw a bullseye around it”. But this second conception
is also confronted with various methodological diculties. A rst diculty,
that is also discussed by Weinberg and Crowley, is the case of divergent in-
tuitions. As we discussed already, it is in any case conceivable, and perhaps
even actually the case that dierent subgroups of a linguistic community
dier in their intuitive judgments about how to apply a term to an actual
or counterfactual case. What should constitutivism say about such cases?
One way to accommodate divergent intuitions could be to endorse some
sort of relativism about the relevant philosophical truths, another would be
to consider the intuitions of one subgroup of the language community to be
more interesting or relevant for philosophy than the others. For example,
we might think that we are interested in what, say, ‘free will’ means, because
we philosophers seem to have a prima facie diculty to reconcile our idea
of free will with belief in a deterministic universe. us, conceptual analy-
ses are interesting, because the concepts we are trying to analyze lead to a
philosophical problem. In so far as we are trying to solve that problem by
means of conceptual analysis, it seems we should privilege our (the philoso-
phers’) intuitions about the relevant terms and concepts over the intuitions
of others, because it was us philosophers who had the problem in the rst
place. An analysis of the concept of other groups of the language community
doesn’t seem relevant for solving the philosophical problem that the concep-
tual analysis was sought for in the rst place.
But even if that problem could be solved, constitutivism would still face
the further problem that we don’t, in philosophical practice, consider all in-
tuitions infallible. Even if our intuitive judgments are expressions of our
linguistic competence, we should make at least a distinction between com-
petence and performance and treat our conceptual intuitions the way that
linguistic intuitions get treated in the Chomskian program. Two varieties of
“loose” constitutivism that could accommodate performance errors as well
as diverging intuitions are discussed in Jonathan Weinberg’s and Stephen
Crowley’s contribution to this volume. As they argue, both of these accounts
face diculties thatmake it unlikely thatwe can tell from the armchairwhich
intuitions to trust. us, in any case, as also Talbot argues in his paper, we
will need to start with a psychologically informed theory of intuitions even
if we are “merely” interested in conceptual analysis rather than “the things
in themselves”.
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But there are further reasons to doubt that the conceptual analysis con-
ception is as unproblematic as it prima facie seems. We said above that a lot
of its primary appeal stems from the fact that it has some similarity to the
Chomskian project of reconstructing the tacit knowledge of grammatical
rules via investigating the grammaticality intuitions of competent speakers.
However, Michael Devitt (2006) has forcefully argued that the Chomskian
appeal to intuitions is already mistaken. According to Devitt, linguistic in-
tuitions aren’t directly linked to the language faculty, and thus immediate
products of our tacit knowledge of grammatical rules, but are instead “em-
pirical theory-laden fairly immediate and unreective central-processor re-
sponses to linguistic phenomena” and as such a poor basis for the recon-
struction of the psychologically reality of speakers. What linguists should
instead be investigating is linguistic reality, and for that purpose speaker in-
tuitions seem less important—as Devitt argues—than the intuitions of lin-
guists themselves, which are experts for linguistic reality. e contribution
by Gergő Somodi discusses Devitt’s own conception and his criticism of
Chomsky’s project. Somodi agrees with Devitt that linguists should be con-
cerned with linguistic reality, but argues that since linguistic reality is con-
tinuously changing due to the way that ordinary speakers change their ways
of using the language, the intuitions of common folk should be at least as
reliable as the intuitions of experts in determining what the current state of
linguistic reality is. However, on Somodi’s and Devitt’s conception of how
linguistics should re-consider the methodological role of intuitions with re-
spect to its proper subject matter (linguistic reality as opposed to the psy-
chological reality of speakers), the analogy to the standard internalist con-
ception of conceptual analysis seems to break down.
Above we also took for granted that what, e.g., ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, or
‘consciousness’ mean is a matter that is ultimately mental, and thus intu-
itively accessible. Externalists about meaning will probably not agree with
this assumption. Some hardcore externalists believe that any form of a pri-
ori conceptual analysis is impossible, at least when it comes to natural kind
concepts. Jussi Haukioja’s contribution discusses the arguments of the hard-
core externalists and investigates to what extent we might have substantial
a priori knowledge about what it is for something to fall under our natu-
ral kind concepts. Haukioja argues that we can, merely on the basis of our
competence with the relevant concepts, know at least some specication of
the reference-xers of our terms. us, some (still suciently substantial)
form of conceptual analysis is compatible with the fundamental insights of
externalism.
Most philosophers in the contemporary debate seem to believe that this
second conception, reconstructive conceptual analysis, is the only form of
Daniel Cohnitz, Sören Häggqvist xiii
linguistic philosophy. As Sebatian Lutz emphasizes in his contribution, this
overlooks at least one other traditional conception of analytic philosophy,
the ideal language conception. On this conception it is not surprising that
ordinary language allows for dierent and unstable intuitions about the ap-
plication conditions of our terms.at is why philosophy should develop a
new, regimented, ideal language. Intuitions of ordinary speakers play only a
starting point in this process, helping us to identify the “explicandum”, these
aspects of our ordinary concept that we wish to preserve in the regimented
concept. As Lutz argues, the old and almost forgotten debate between ordi-
nary and ideal linguistic philosophy gets new input from the results of ex-
perimental philosophy, which might be especially important in light of the
recent re-evaluation of the philosophy of logical positivism.
On the ideal language conception, the current philosophical method-
ology might be overemphasizing intuitions. Similarly, Jonathan Ichikawa
argues that many are exaggerating the importance of explaining away re-
calcitrant intuitions. Why, he asks, should philosophers be under any obli-
gation to provide explanations of certain mental happenings—intuitions—
when scientists are under no parallel obligation to explain why some people
hold beliefs incompatible with the scientists’ theories? Ichikawa emphasises
that explaining away intuitions is an enterprise that belongs to psychology,
a eld in which philosophers are not generally experts.
One possible rejoinder might be to insist that in philosophy, intuitions
are used as evidence, perhaps even the only evidence, whereas scientic the-
ories are justied independently of people’s beliefs. To wilfully neglect con-
icting evidence without oering an explanation of why the oending intu-
itions exist exposes the philosopher to accusations of, if not narcissism (cf.
the quote fromMachery et al. in section 2.1 above), at least chauvinism. But
of course, this just highlights the question whether intuitions are evidence,
or whether appeals to intuitions are rather rhetorical appeals to consensus.
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